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In

The Supreme <9ourt
of the

State of Utah
CARL JOHANSON and CLARA J.
JOHANSON, His Wife1
Appellants

CUDAHY PACKING COMPANY, a
Corporation,
Respondent.
Appeal From the Third Judicial District Court of
Salt Lake County
Honorable M. J. Bronson, Judge

Appellants' Abstract and Brief
An order was heretofore made hy the Court p~r
mitting appellants to combine their abstract and
brief. The appeal in this cause is tak8n fron1 an
order of the District Court of Salt Lake County
sustaining a general demurrer and dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. The abstract of the record v;ill include only the material pleadings.
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ABSTRACT OF RECORD
COMPLAINT
(TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE).
1

Plaintiffs complain of the defendant and for
cause of action allege :

1.
That plaintiffs herein are the father ana
mother of one Robert- Johanson, deceased, and
are the only heirs at law of the said decedent.

2.
That the defendant is a corporation of the State
of Maine1 duly authorized to do and transact
business within the State of Utah, and is engaged in the general meat packing business
and has its plant at North Salt Lake, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.

3.
That at all times hereinafter mentioned the
said Robert Johanson was an employee of the
Royal Crystal Salt Company, which operates
its plant and business near the highway approximately ten 1niles west of Salt Lake City,
Utah; that on the 3rd day of June, 1938, at
approximately the hour of 7:45 o'clock A.M. of
said date, the saiq Robert Johanson and one
Raleigh Johnson, a fellow employee, were
directed by their employer to deliver a truck
load of salt of about ten tons to the plant of
the defendant herein, in pursuance of an order
made by the said defendant to the Royal Crystal
Salt Company; that the delivery of said order
was made in it large steel body closed-in truck,
the top of virhich was approximately eleven feet
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from the ground, and w·hich had two doors in
the rear thereof opening outward.

4.
That pursuant to the direction of his employer
the said Robert Johanson) together with the
said Raleig1h Johnson, drove said truck load
of salt to the plant of the defendant herein and
upon arrival at said plant the foreman of defendant's plant (whose name is tq the plaintiff unknown, but whom plaintiff is advised is
named Griffith), whQ at said time and place
'vas acting in the course of his employment,
directed the said Robert Johanson and the said
Raleigh Johnson to deliver said salt to the company's ice plant, which is situated in the rear
of the main building of defendant company's
plant. That in order to reach said ice plant
it was necessary to back said truck through an
alleyway which was only Wide enough to permit said truck to pass through and which had
buildings on either side thereof tor a distance
of approximately 140 feet to the platform of
said ice plant, which platform extended to said
alleyway from the rear of said ice plant
huilding.

5.
That there had theretofore been stretched
across said alleyway a seri?s of tl1ree · wires,
'v~·lich carried a higl1 and dangerous voltage of
p]ectricity, to wit: 440 volts, immediately east
of the platform hereinbefore referred to, and
defendant had careles~;ly and negligently permitted said wires to become out of repair, so
that th-e same sagged down into said alleyway
to such an extent as to make it impossible to
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

operate said truck along said alleyway without
coming into contact with said wires, all of which
facts were well known to the ·defendant, or in
the exercise of reasonable care could have been
known to it; that the defendant, knowing the
presence of said wires and the sa~ging condition
thereof, carelessly and negligently failed to
advise the said Robert Johanson ana the said
Raleigh Johnson of the presence of said wires
and of the high voltag~e of electricity carried
therein, and carele-ssly and negligently directed
the said Robert Johanson and the said Raleigh
Johnson to back said truck along said alleyway
and the said Robert Johanson and the said
Raleigh Johnson, without knowledge- of said
wires or that the same had sagged down so that
said truck would come in contact therewith, and
without knowledge that said wires were charged
with a high and dangerous voltage of electricity, pursuant to defendant's direction, backed
said truck along said alleyway and against said
wires, whereby and by reason whereof said
truck became charged with a high voltage of
electricity, and the said Robert Johanson, not
knowing ·of the presence of said wiTes and that
the same had come in contact with said truck
and had charged the body of said truck with a
high voltage of electricity, went to the rear of
said truck and took hold of the handle of the
door thereof to open the same; that as the said
Robert Johanson took hold of said handle a
large voltage of electricity passed through his
body, killing him instantly.

6.
That the said Robert Johanson was a strong
nnd able-bodied man of the age of twenty-eight
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years and was earning frmn his employment
approximately one hund1·ed and fifty dollars
per n1onth, of which su1n he was contributing
the sum of sixty dollars per month to the support of his parents, Carl J oha.nson and Clara
J. Johanson, who are old and infirm and have
no income or property of their own, and who
were dependent upon the said decedent for their
support; that at the time of the death of the
said Robert Johanson, as aforesaid, he was living with the said plaintiffs at their home in
Grantsville, Utah.

7.
That the death of the said Robert Johanson
was the direct and proximate resU:1t of theJ
carelessness and negligence of the defendant,
as hereinbefore set forth, all to the injury and
damage of the plaintiffs herein in the sum of
Two Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($2,950.00).

8.
That at the time of the occurrence hereinbefore
mentioned, the Royal Crystal Salt Company
was insured under Utah vVorlunen's Compensation Act with the London Guarantee & Accident Company, Ltd.; that after the death of
said Robert Johanson, the plaintiffs herein
applied to the Industrial Commission of Utah
and were awarded compensation under said la \\'
in the sum of approximately $2,500.00, hy reason of which the said London Guarantee & Accident Company, Ltd., became subrogated to the
rights of the plaintiffs herein in said cause
of action again~t the defendant, under the provisions of Section 42-1-58, Revised Statutes of
Utah, 1933; that subsequent thereto on the 29th
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day of August, 1939 the said London Guarantee & Accident Company, Ltd., for a valuable
consideration, executed and delivered to the
plaintiffs herein a waive.r of said right of subrogation apd an assignment of its said cause
of action against the said defendant herein, and
that the plaintiffs are now the owners of said;
cause of action against the defendants with full
right to bring and prosecute this action.
Wherefore, plaintiffs pray judgment against
the defendant for the sum of $2,950.00 and for
costs of suit herein and for such other and further relief as is deemed meet and equitable in
the premises
E. LEROY SHIELDS,
Attorney for Plaintiffs.
Duly verified.
Filed September 2, 1939

DEMURRER
(TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSITI).
And now comes the Cudahy Packing Company,
a corporation, and demurs to the complaint of
the plaintiffs on the following grounds, towit:
L
That said complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in favor
of the plaintiffs and against the defendant.

2.
That it appears from ·the facts stated in the
complaint that whatever right of action, if any,
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ag·ainst this defendaut for negligently
causing the death of Robert J-ohanson, the deceased mentioned in the complaint, is now, and
ever since the awa.rd of compensation by the
Industrial Commission of the State of Utah,
the substance of which award is set forth in
Paragraph 8 of the plaintiffs' complaint, has
been vested in the London Guarantee & Accict:~nt C01npany, Ltd., and not in the plaintiffs,
and that said plaintiffs have no right, power
or capacity to institute, prosecute or maintain
this action against this defendant.

3.
That it appears from the facts stated in the
complaint that the plaintiffs have instituted,
and now prosecute and maintain, this action,
not in their own right but as assignees of the
London Guarantee & Accident Company, Ltd.,
nursnant to a purported assignment dated the
~9th day of August, 1939, designated in Paragraph 8 of the complaint as ''a waiver of said
right of subrogation and an assignment of its
said cause of action against the said defendant
herein;'' that said assignment is in law null,
void and of no effect; that th~ caus.e of action,
if any, which existed in favor of the London
Guarantee & Accident Company, Ltd., and to
which said companv was in law subrogated, was
not and is not as~ignable. as a matter of law,
and that by reason of the facts appearing on
the face of the complaint the plaintiffs are not
the owners of the cause of action stated .Qr
attempted to be stated in the complaint, and
that neith~r of said plaintiffs has any right
whatsoever to prosecute or maintain said
action.
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Wherefore, .the defendant prays that this demurrer be sustained and that it be adjudged
that the complaint does not s.tate facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in favor
of the plaintiffs or either of them and against
this defendant.
MARLON E. WILSON,
Attorney for Defendant.
CERTIFICATE
And now comes Mahlon E. Wilson and hereby
certifies to the court that he is the attorney in
the above entitled cause; that he has prepared
and read the foregoing demurrer and that the
same is well founded in law; and he further
certifies that said demurrer is served and filed
in good faith and not for the purpose of hindering or delaying the prosecution of said action.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 17th day
of October, A. D., 1939.
MARLON E. WILSON.
Filed October 17, 1939.

.TUDGM~NT
(TITLE OF COURT AND. CAUSE).
This cause came on for hearing on the .... day
of May, A. D., 1940, before the Honorable M. J.
Bronson, Judge of said court in the above entitled cause, Messrs. E. LeRoy Shields and A. H.
Hougaard appearing as attorneys ~or the
plaintiffs, and Messrs. M. E. Wilson and Robert C. Wilson appearing as attorneys for the
defendant; and it appearing to the court that
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an onler had already been n1ade by said court
in said cause sustaining the defendant's demurrer to the complaint of the plaintiffs, and
giving- the plaintiffs a rig-ht to amend; and it
being further made to appear to the court that
the plaintiffs, by their attorneys, do in open
court decline this right to amend, and refuse
to plead further and elect to stand upon the
complaint of the plaintiffs,
Xow, Therefore, on motion of M. E. Wilson,
attorney for defendant, it is ordered, adjudged
and decreed that the plaintiffs take nothing- by
their action, and that the complaint herein be
and the same i~ hereby dismissed, and that the
defendant recover from the plaintif:ffs whatever costs, if any, may be taxed according to
law.
Done in open court this 17th day of May, A. D.
1940.
~L

Filed

~£ay

J. BRONSON, Judge.

17, 1940.

NOTICE OF APPEA.L
(TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE).
To the Cudahy Packing Company, a Corporation, Defendant Above Named, and to
M. E. Wilson, Attorney for Said Defendant:
You, and each of you) will please take notice
that the plaintiffs above named hereby appeal
to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah from
~he judgment heretofore entered· on or about
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the 17th day of May, 1940 in favor of the defend_ant and against the plaintiffs, dismissing
said plaintiffs' complaint and awarding defendant cOsts against the plaintiffs~ and from the
whole of said judgment.
This appeal is taken upon questions of l:ioth
law and fact.
E. LEROY SHIELDS,
A. H. HOUGAARD,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
Received a copy of the foregoing Notice this
13th day of August, 1940.
M. E. WILSON.
Attorney for Defendant.
~-,iled August 13, 1940.

ASSIG-NMENTS OF ERROR
(TITLE OF COURT AND C~t\.USE:}.
Come now the appellants, Carl Johanson and
Clara J. Johanson, his wife, and assign the foL
lowing errors occurring in the trial of this
cause before the Honorable ~I. J. Bronson, one
of the judges of said court, upon which said
errors appellants rely for a reversal of the
Judgment entered by the court dismissing
plaintiffs' complaint and awarding to the defendant its costs, and from the order of the
court sustaining the defendant's demurrer to
plaintiffs' complaint.

I.
The court erred in sustaining thf' defendant's
demurn~r to plaintiffs' complaint. (Tr. 9).

II.
The court erreQ. in dismissing the plaintiffs'
complaint and awarding judgment to the deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fendant for its costs incurred 1n said action.
(Tr. 11).

III.
The court erred in n1aking and rendering its
judg1nent whereby it was ordered, adjudged
and decreed that the plaintiffs take nothing, by
their action; that the complaint of the plair·
tiffs be dismissed, and that the defendant recover from the plaintiffs whatever costs, if any,
may be t~xed according to law. (Tr. 13).

E. LEROY SHIELDS,
A. H. HOUGAARD~
Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
Received copy of the foregoing Assignments of
Error thi~ ...... day of September, 1940.
M. E. WILSON.
Attorney for Defendant.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs are the
father and mother of one Robert Johanson, deceased; that the defendant is a corporation transacting its business in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah; that on the 3rd day of June, 1938, said Robert
,Johan~on was an employee of the Royal Crysta 1
Salt Company; that on said day at about the hour of
7:45 o'clock A. ~L the said Robert J ohaJlson came
to his death while making delivery of a truck load of
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salt at the plant of the Cudahy Packing Company;
that the driver of the truck upon arriving at the
defendant's yard was directed by an employee of
the defendant to pass through a certain alleyway
leading to the defendant's ice plant; tha.t while following these directions and while passing through
said alleyway to the ice plant the truck came in contact With certain high voltage electric wires which
had been permitted to sag and become out of repair;
that the truck came in contact with the wires and
became charged with a high voltage of electricity;
that the deceased took hold of the handle of the
truck door to open the same incident to unloading
the salt. and was instantly killed by a large voltage
of electricity passing through his body. It is further alleged that the accident arose out of or in the
course of J ohans.on 's employment with the Salt
Company, and that his death was caused by the neg~
ligent acts of the defendant; that the plaintiffs are
the mother and father of the deceased and wen~
dependent up_on him for their support.
The complaint also alleges that the plaintiffs applied
for and were awarded compensation by the Industrial Commission of Utah in the sum of $2500.00;
that this compensation was paid by the London
Guarantee & Accident Company, Ltd., the insurance carrier for the Crystal Salt Company, and that
said insurance company became subrogated to the
rights of the plaintiffs in their cause of action
against the defendant, Cudahy Packing Company,
under and pursuant to the provisions of Section
42-1-58, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933; that subsequently and on the 29th day of August, 1939, the
London Guarantee & Accident Company, Ltd., executed and delivered to the plaintiffs a waiver of its
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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rig·ht of ~abrogation and an assignment of its cause
of action_
i:)ection 42-158, Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933, provides :
\Yhen any injury for which compensation
is payable under this title shall have been
cau::5ed by the wrongful act of a third person, the injured employee, or in case of
death his dependents, may at their option
rlaim compensation under this title or have
their action for damages against such third
person : and, if compensation is claimed and
a"Tarded the employer or insurance carrier
haYing paiq the compensation shall be
~uhrogated to the rights of such employee
or his dependents to recover against such
third person; . provided, if such recovery
shall be in excess of the amount of the compensation awarded and paid, then such ex-.
cess. less the reasonable expens.os of the
action, shall be paid to the employee or his
rl r>pcmdents.
The plaintiffs exercised their right under thi& se~
tion of the statute to claim compensation, and having been awarded and paid compensation the insurance carrier, London Guarantee & Accident Company, Ltd., became subrogated to the rights of the
plaintiffs to recover against the Cudahy Packing
Company. The rights that the insurance carrier
had under this section were waived and its cause
of action assigned to the plaintiff. r.rhe sole question on this appeal relates to the right of the plaintiff's to maintain this action.
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ARGUMENT
The defendant jn thi_s case admits that when the
London Guarantee & Accident Company, ~td., had
compensation awarded against it by the Industrial
Commission of Utah, a cause of action then aros,e in
its favor against the person negligently causing the
death of Johanson, hut it contends that Ruch cause
of action vested in the insurance carrier and was not
thereafter assignable and that any attempted
m;signment was not authorized by law. We say that
the defendant so contends b_ecause Ruch f;ontention
was made in its brief filed in the District Court.
It is to be noted, however, that the insurance carrier not only assigned its cause of action hut waived
its right of subrogation. Aside from this assignment and waiver we believe the plaintiffs could
maintain this action in view of their interest unde1~
Section 42-1-58. There is ample authority for this
position and that the wrongdoer, in this case the
Cudahy Packing Company, may not question such
right.
The statute provides that if recovery (by the ('mployer or insurance carrier) shall be- in excet-'s of.
the amount of compensation awarded and paid, then
such excess, less the reasonable expenses of the
action, shall he pairl to the employee or his depeildents. The purpose of the statute is clear. It wa~
without doubt the intention of the legislature that
the employer or insurance carrier should not profit
by the injury or death of the employee and that if
a greater sum was recovered than the amount paid.
as compensation that this exeess should go to thr.
employee or his dependents. lTnder f?UCh circumstances it would seem that the injured employee or.
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in the event of his death, the dependents ha.ve such an
interest in the cause of action that they would be
proper parties plaintiff.
It is undoubtedly the law, as arg·ued by the defendant in the lower court, that until Lord CaJnpbell 's
Act was passed that no remedy was afforded for
death by wrongful act and that at the present tiine
such rig·ht exists only as the result of statutory enactment. Our statute, Section 104-3-11, provides
for the maintenance of an actiqn for damages grow_
1ng out of the death of an adult person by wrongful act. Under this statute the action may be maintained by either the heirs or the- personal representativ~ for the benefit of the heirs. In the absence
of statute it has been quite generally held that the
cause of action for wrongful death is not assignable.
This is because the statute creates a cause of action
for specific persons. In Utah we have a statute,
Section 42-1-58, \vhich provides that the rights of
those who may maintain the action are subrogated
to certain per~ons paying compensation. This cause
of action exists for a dual purpose under the plain
provisions of the act. First, to restore to the mnployer or insurance carric•r what it may have paid
by way of compensation, and second,_ to secure additional benefits to the dependents. vVe do not believe the legislature intended to preclude recovery
against a third person responsible for injury or
death merely because the person entitled to recover
had received compensation. The statute 1nakes
specific provision for the payment of all money to
the dependents in excess of the amount of compensation paid, and the reasonable expense incident to
recovery. This clearly indicates the purpose and
intention that the employee or his dependents shall
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not be deprived of their right to recover for injury
or death.
Who then would have the right to maintain an action against the wrongdoer~ Under Section 104-3-11
this action may be maintained by the heirs or the
personal representative for the benefit of the heirs.
Under Section 42-1-58 the employer or insurance
carrier are subrog]ated to the rights o:i the employee
or his dependents to recover against the wrongdoer
and they may maintain an action. If they do not
desire to exercis.e this right or waive the same, as in
the case at bar, then there is no reason why other
pers~ns for whose benefit the statute was passed
may not do so. These persons, under the statute,
are the dependents, who in this case are heir:;, tnwit, the father and mother of the deceased. They
would be entitled to maintain the action not only as
heirs but as dependents and whoRe dependency ha~
already been es.ta.blished. Two cases somewhat recentlv decided by the Supreme Court of the United
Rtates are interesting upon the subject. They do
not involve the question of subrogation of assignment but do involve a consideration of who may
maintain the action where compensation has been
pa.id and -recovery is sought against a third party
wrongdoer responsible for death.
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Moses, 287
U. S. 530; 77 L. Ed. 477; 88 A. L. R
647
Doleman v. Levine, 295 U. S. 221; 79 L. Ed
1402.
In the Aetna case, the widow of an employee who
was killed in the course of his employment. and who
was also the administratrix and the sole beneficiary
under both t!1p compensation and thP. wrongful
death acts, elected to receive compensation. It was
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conceded that the widow before her election to take
compensation wa~ alone entitled to the benefit of
the \\'rongful Death Act and the lluestion was who,
in consequence of her election was the proper plaintiff to bring the action. 'rhe Court held in construing Section 33 of the (District of Columbia)
Compensatio_n Act, that since the transfer of her
entire interest was effected by the act the employer
was entitled to maintain the suit against the wrongdoer in his own name without the necessity of su1ng
in the nan1e of the administratrix. It is contended
by the defendant in that case that the employer
could not maintain the action.
In the Doleman case, supra, the Court again construed the District Compensation Act and held that
where the right of the dependent, to which the dm~
ployer is subrogated by Section 33 (h), d_eclaring
that acceptance of compensation shall operate as
an assignment to the employer of all right of the
person entitled to compensation to recover damages
against third persons, there is transferred to the
employer, in case of acceptance of compensation,
only such rights as the dependents electing to receive compen sa tion otherwise would have to share
in the benefits of the Wrongful Death Act, the employer being entitlerl to maintain suit if such dependents are entitled to the whole recovery. and. if
their int~rest is less than the whole. being entitled
to receive their share in the proceeds of recovery,
.and. if necessary, to compel the administrntor t0
hrin9.' suit and account for the proceeds.
The District Compensation Act. construerl by the
Rupreme Conrt of thP United States (Section 33 of
the act appears in a footnote to the case) provided
that ''acceptance of such compensation shall oper~
atr ns an :1~signmenf. to the employer of all right of
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the person entitled to compensation to recover damages against such third person."'' The act further
provides that the employer shall pay any excess to
the person entitled to compensation or to the representative. In the_ . a.etna case, the Supreme Court
said that the employer could maintain the action
because the entire recovery would pass to the person who had received compensation. In the Doleman case it held the employer could not maintain
the action because there may be next of kin of the
decedent entitled to share in the recovery for wrong_
ful death and who were not entitled to compensation
and others who elected to take their share of the
recovery for wrongful death instead of compensation. The Supreme Court thus concludes its opinion in the Doleman case:

"Vve

conclude that where the employer is
given anything to recover by a suit brought
directly against the wrongdoer, it is the full
recovery to which the injured employee or
his personal representative would be entitled. See Aetna L. Ins. Co. v. Moses,
supra (287 U. S. 540; 77 L. Ed. 481; 53 S.
Ct. 231; 88 A. L. R. 647). But where the
right of the dependent, to which the employer is suhrog'ated by and 33 (h), is only
to a share of the proceeds of the recovery,
the employer is not authorized to maintain
the action for wrongful death.''
These two decisions decide when the employer rna:
or- may not maintain the suit, in view of the pro
visions of the District of Columbia statute. N'
consideration is given to the effect of a. waiver o
the employer's right of subrogation or his assigJ
ment of the cause of action. The District statut
differs from the Utah statute in that the Distri<
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
statute says that acceptance of compensation operates as an assignment to the en1ployer while the
Utah statute says that if compensation is claimed
and awarded the employer or insurance carrier
"shall be subrogated to the rights of such employee
or his dependents to recover against such third
person.''
We think that the en1ployer or insurance carrier
may waiv~ their right of subrogation and when
waived there is no impediment to the heirs or dependents bringing the action. Such ri2;ht is not
necessarily based upon an assignment of the cause
of action and without such assignment leaves the
right to maintain the action as it exists under Section 104-3-11, not as a new cause of action but a
cause of action recognized by this section and amplified and extended by the provisions of 42-1-58. But,
the insurance carrier in the case at bar not only
waived its right of subrogation but assig11ed the
cause of action to the plaintiffs. The effectiveness
of the assignment is challenged by the defenrlant.
upon the gJround that the cause of action for wrongful death under 104-3-11 for the benefit of certain
designated person~, cannot be assigned and that
Section 42-1-58 in effect creates a new cause of action for wrongful de·ath in other persons, towit, the
employer or insurance carrier. and that these persons so designated are ·without right to makP ::1
la:\vful assignment. This contenUon overlooks thPf~wt that under Section 42-1-58 no provision is n1ad~~
for assignment but merely suhroga.tes the PmployP 1"
or insurance carrier to the rig"hts of the employee
or dependents. Because of such subrogation thP
rio-ht as it exists under 104-3-11 is not taken away
h 1 ~~ th~ l'~"overv wbPn made iR designated for th~
henefit of thP dependPnts instead of the heirs.
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We call the Court's attention to
Sections 1590-1605, 71 C. J., Title Workmen's Compensation Acts.
The effect and purpose of a provision for subrogation is discussed in Section 1590. It is said in Section 1590 that a provision for subrogation to the
rights of
injured employee against a third person
is for the benefit of the employer or insurer; that
such provision is not intended for the benefit of
the negligent third person and does not relieve him
rfrom liability. If the employer's rights are protected, the third person may not object to the maintenance of an action by the employee and that an
action by the insurer who pays compensation is for
the benefit of both insurer and the employee under
some of the acts.

an

In Section 1591 distinctions are noted between causes
of action which are assigned and those where rights
are subrogated by statute, and it points out tliat
where an assignment to the employer pursuant to
the act has once become effective, title to the cause
of action so vested may not be divested without the
employer's consent, either by the employee or by
the Industrial Commission.
In Section 1593, speaking of similar provisions in
compensation statutes, it is Raid that if cmnpensation js claiu1Nl and awarded or paid under the Act
the employer or insurance carrier n1ay enforce for
his benefit the liability of a person other than thP
employer and does not take away common law right~
from anyone but merely declares how the right shall
be regulated with respect to its use; that they do
not create new causes of action.
Considering the effect of the substitution where it
is considered as an assignment, or the assignment
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where the statute Inakes such provision, and considering the same in relation to transfer of the entire interest, it is said in Section 1594 that it has
been recognized that the entire cause of action may
be transferred, but under a provision that the receipt of co-mpensation shall operate as an assignment to an employer or insurer to the extent of the
liability of the employer to the employee occasioned
by the injury, there is then only a partial assignment, and that the view has been taken that a pro\~ision for subrogation does not effect a transfer to
the employer of the entire cause of action of thP
employee.
Black v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., 17+
N. W. 774.
It is said in ~ection 1601 that where the act effects
the assignment of the cause of action, questions as
to whether a cause of action in tort is assignable~
and as to the consent of the debtor or tort-feasor,
and rules against a splitting of causes of action, if
the act provides for a partial assignment, yield to
the provisions of the act, and in Section 1602, that
where under the act the employee or dependents of
the deceaf'ed employee have a beneficial interest in
the amount recoverable from such person, if such
amount is more than sufficient to indemnify the
employer or insurer, nRually the right of the employer or insurer 'vho is entitled to subrogation
under the act is not exclusive and the employee, or,
jn the ca~e of the dePth of the employee, the dependent~, or the personal representative of the employee
may sue as a real party in interest. It is further
f~rrid that under a nrovision for the subrogation of
the emr·loyer the YlPW has b-een taken, however, that
the right of the employee (this undoubtedlv intended tn the employrr) to hring an action is exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

elusive until the employer neglects or refuses to
bring the action, and prior to such neglect and refusal, the employee may not sue, but if the employer
refuses to sue then the employee may sue in his
own behalf.
We submit that where the employer or insurance
carrier, having paid compensation neglects or refuses to _sue, or, where, as here, the insurance carrier waives his right of subrogation, then the employee or the dependents of the deceased employee
may bring the action. If this we~e not true then
th~ employer or insurance carrier, by secret agreements and understandings or by neglect, could defeat the employee or dependents of" rights against
wrongdoers, which the s.tatute contemplates shall
jnur~ to their benefit. Certainly the right of subrogation given to the employer or insurance eartier by our statute is for their benefit and may be
waived. It. is said in
Section 1603, C. J., supra,
that the benefit of or rights acquired undPr provisions of the general type here considered may be
waivQd hy the employer or insurer, or lost by es,top~el, and if by any agreement between the employr.r
and the employee the right to bring an action against
the to-rt-feasor is left with the employee thP. tortfeasor may not complain.
Thomas v. Otis

El~vator

Co., 172 N. W. 53.

Prior to the 1933 revision of the Utah statute it
was provided,
Laws of Utnh 1921, Chapter 67,
that the cause of action against the third person
should be assignable, whether for injury or death,
and the dependents or the personal representative
and nt:lt the heirs were given the right to make a
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full and exclusive assignment. The apparent intention of this statute was to make it possible to
assign a. cause of action arising· out of negligent injury or \\Tongful death so that the employer or dependents could recover ag,ainst a tort-feasor. There
is certainly no apparent intention by th~ 1933 revision to lessen this right. The legislature did away
with the language relating to assignments and sub-rogated thP. person paying compensation to thf;J
rights of the dependents to the ext~mt that compen..
sation was paid. Under the 1921 statute this Court
held in
Robinson Y. Industrial Comrnission, 2n9 P.
513; 66 A. L. R. 1343; 72 Utah 203-.
that as~ignn1ent of the cause of action vvas necessary and a condi_tion precedent to the payment of
compen!Sation.
A great many cases have been decided relating to
the right of the employer, the employee and the insurance carrier to recover against third persrms.
It would unduly prolong this brief to attempt a review of the many cases which have passed upon
this que?tion or an analysis of the various r-:.tatutory
provisioPs. The cases are reviewed in annotations
in A. L. R. as follows:

19 A. L. R. 766.
27 A. L. R. 493.
37 A. L. R. 83~.
88 A L. R. 665, and
106 A. L. R. 1040.
The general tre-nd of th~ majority of tlw cases if>
to the eff~ct that the compensation a.et does :'\Ot take
away the right of the employee or his dependents to
recover against an offending thhd person, even
though c01npensation has been paid. The right of
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the employer or insurance carrier to recover back
what has been paid by way of cornpensation has
quite gen~rally been upheld under most oi the
statutes.
The right to assign a cause of action arising out
of the negligence of a third person has quite generally been uph~ld.
lVIcGarbey v. Independent Oil & Gas Co.
146 N. W. 895.
Saudek v. Milwaukee Electric R. & Light
Co., 157 N. W. -579.
Frankfort Gen. Ins. Co. v. Milwaukee.. 159
N. W. 581.
Ridley v. United Sash & Door Co. {Okla.),
224 P. 351.
In the Oklahoma case it was held that an employer
or insurance carrier who has been compelled to pay
compensation to an employee because of inJury received as a result of the negligence of a third pei.'son may assign the right of action against such
negligent third person, and, where such assignment
is made by the employer to the injured employee,
who thereupon sues upon .said assignment, the limit
of recovery is the amount to which such employer
was subrog:ated, together with legal interest therel(}n from the date of subrogation.
;The Oklahon1a statute provided that if the employee
elected to take compensation the cause of a.ction
against the third person shall be assigned to the
~nsnrance carrier liable for the payment of compensation, and if the employee elected to proceed
against such other person or insurance carrier, as
the case may be, the insurance carrier shall con··
tribute only the deficiency, if any, between the
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amount of recovery ag,ainst such other person and
the compensation provided or estin1ated by the act
in such case.
The essential point in the case is the fact that it
was held that the cause of action was assignable
back to the employee by the insurance carrier who
paid the compensation and that such employee
could maintain the action. In
Globe Indemnity Co. v. Taye Bros., 129 So.
234,
it was held that a provision of the compensation act
that payments due under the act should not be assignable, was held to refer to claims for payments
due to the employee under the act and not to prevent an assignment by an insurance carrier of the
employer's claim against a third person whose neg-lig-ence caused an injury to an employee.
This Court held in
Industrial Commission v. \Yas.atch Grading
Co., ... Utah ... ; 14 P. (2d) 988.
thR.t an employee injured by the negligence of a
third -party would not lose his right to commence
his action against such party until he had, under
the compensation act. acquired a right to conlpensation, and that he was not divested of the right
to maintain the action until he had assigned it, and
that, before such assignment he was the real party
in interest and was entitled to maintain an action
against a third party tort-fea~or.
This case was decided before the 1933 revision of
our statute at which time assignment was a condition precedent to a claim for compensation. If,
under the 1921 law, the employee or his dependents
were the rPn] parties in interest, "he, or his dependents would ~till be the real parties in interest f0r the
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purpose of recovery against a third party wrong·
doer. Under our
Survival Statute, Section 102-11-5,
no specific provision is made for the survival of
actions gro~ng out of torts causing damage to
property yet it was determined by this Court in
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. D. & R. G.
Ry. Co., (Utah), 137 P. 653,
that a claim by the owner of property negligently
destroyed by a railroad company, for damages for
its destruction is assignable, and that an insurance
company receiving an assignment of the property
owner's claim for such damages against the railroad company was the real party in interest so as
to entitle it to sue on such assignment in its own
name. Upon this same subject we invite the Court's
attention to the following cases:
Martell v. Kutcher, 216 N. W. 522.
Swanson v. Lake Superior Ter. & Trans.
R. Co., 219 N. W. 274.
Two recent cases,
Moseley v. Lily Ice Cream Co. (Ariz.); 300
P. 958, and
I{andelin v. Lee Moor Contracting Co.
(N.1I.) :24 P. (2'd) 731,
consider the question in the light of varying statutes and decisions. In the Arizona case the statute
was in the following language:
1435. ''Liability of third person to injured
employee. If an employee entitled to compensation hereunder is injured or killed by
th~ negligence or wrong of another not in
the same employ, such injured employee, or
in case of death, his dependents, shall elect
whether to take compensation under this
title or to pursue his remedy against such
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other. If he elect to take con1pensation, tne
cause of action against such other shall be
a:-;~1gued to the ~tate for the benefit of the
compensation fund, or to the person liable
for the payinent thereof, and if he elect to
proceed against such other, the compensation fund or person, shall contribute only
the deficiency between the amount actually
collected and the compensation provided or
estilnatcd herein for such case. Compromise of any such cause of action by the employee or his dependents at an amount less
than the compensation provided for herein
shall be made only within the written
approval of the cmnmission, or of the person liable to pay the same.''
The .._1\.rizona Court held under the provisions of this
statute that where the employee injured by a third
person elects to take compensation all his rights
against the third person pass, as a matter of law,
to the State. The Arizona Court classifies the decisions and statutes in the United States on this
subject into three groups. It was held that the
Arizona statute comes under the third class of stat~
utes, and that where the employee has elected to
take compensation and the awarding of such com~
pensation by the terms of the statute effects an assignment of the cause of action, then acceptance of
compensation bars any action by or on behalf or
the employee. This would be similar to the Uhlh
statute as it existed when the Robinson case was
decided by this Court.
Under a different statute, and one that in many re ..
spects is similar to the Utah Act, the Supreme Court
of N p"· '.f exi<'o jn the K~mdelin case, supra, says:
"The first (statute) includes those where
the express right is given to the employee
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to recover compensation and also to sue the
third party for negligence. Typical of such
statutes are those of New Jersey, Kansas,
California., and lowa, and the decisions in
these and other States with like statutes
hold accordingly that acceptance of conlpensation does not defeat the right of the
injured employee to bring a suit against
such third party. (Citing cases) ·
''The second class of statutes does not expressly give the employee the right to reeover compensation and to sue the third
party, but provides that, if compensation is
paid, the errtployer is subrogated to the
rights of the employee so far as the amount
which he has paid is concerned, but that
any surplus he may recover is to go to the
injured employee. In these States it is generally held that the right of action against
the third party still exists, notwithstanding compensation has been paid, and that in
some way or another either by bringing
suit in the name of -the employer or in hls
own name, the employee may maintain the
action. Typical of these States is Texas.
(Citing cases).
The third class of statutes provides that
if the employee elects to bring suit against
the third person and his recovery is less
than that granted by the Compensation
Act, the insurance fund shall make up the
difference, but that if the employee elects
to take compensation, the awarding of compensation ~hall act as an assignment of the
cause of action to the State for the benefit
of the insurance fund, or other insurer. In
these States acceptance of compensation
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29

bars any action against the third person
by or on behalf of the employee. Typical
statutes are those of Kew York, Or~gon
and Oklahoma. (Citing cases).
On comparison with many statutes of these
three classes, it is apparent that the New
Mexico law falls within the first or second
class. We quote McArthur v. Dutee ·w.
Flint Oil Co., Inc. (1929), 50 R. I. 226;
146 A. 484, 486, as affording a satisfactory
interpretation of a statute similar to ours.''
The New l\Iexico statute which forms the basis of
the foregoing conclusion, reads as follows:
'• Section 20 of Article 3, Chapter 92, G. L.
1923, provides as follows·: 'Where the injury for which compensation is payable
under this chapter was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in sonte
person other· than the employer to pay .damages in respect thereof, the employee may
take proceedings both against that person
to recover damages and against any person liable for such compenosation, but shall
not be entitled to receive both damages
and compensation; and if th~ employee has
been paid conipensa tion under this chapter,
thP person by whom the compensation was
paid shall be entitled to indemnity from.
the person so liable to pay rlfl.mag-es fiS
aforf'said, and, to tl1e extent of !7mch indemnity. shall he snhrog-atPd to the rig-hts of
the employee to recover damag-es therefor'.''
The New Mexico statute is substantially the same
as the Utah statute insofar as givin~ to the employee
an election to take compensation or proceed against:
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the third party tort- feasor. The New Mexico Act
says the employee may take proceedings both
against that person to recover damages and against
any person liable to pay compensation, '' but shalt
not be entitled to receive both damages and C01tlpensation.'' r~rhe statute then gives to the person
paying compensation the right to be indemnified
from the person liable to pay damages ''and to the
extent of such indemwity shall be subrogated to the
rights of the employee to recover damages therefor."
The purpose of the New Mexico sta.tute and the
Utah statute seems to be identical; that is to say,
in the event injury is caused by the wrongful or
negligent aet of a third person, the employer or insurer may be reimbursed for the amount paid as
compensation and the injured employee or his dependents may recover for loss occasioned in excess
of compensation paid. The employer or insurance
carrier recovers as a damage to a property right
arising by operation of law under the statute. 'rhe
employee recovers as a damag:e to person. In either
event, the employer or insurance carrier and the
employee are real parties in interest and entitled
to maintain the action. Under neither statute could
it be said that it was the intention of the legislature
to deprive the employee or his dC'pendents from
maintaining his action to recover damages, especially in view of the manifest purpose and intention of
the statute to provide additional benefits to th~
employee or hiR dependents against the wrongfnl
or negligent act of third persons. If the right of
subrogation was not provided for by the statute,
there would he no question about the right of the
employee or his dependents to bring an action to
recover damages nnd such right of subrogation
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being proYided for the benefit of the employer, his
right thereto 1nay be waived. Such was the holding
in the case of
Foster v. Co~ess Square Hotel Uo., 14fi
Atl. 400; 67 A. L. R. 239,
in which case it was held under a similar sta.tute
that the failure of the elnployer or compensation
insurer in interest to pursue his remedy against the
third party within the 90 day period pr9vided by
the act shall entitle the beneficiary or his representatives to enforce the liability in their own name,
and that the employer by such failure or neglect
waives the rig·ht of subrogation. And in
Fournier v. Great Atl. -& Pac. T. Co., 14-R
Atl. 147; 68 A. L. R. 481,
it was held under the same statute that when an
employer by paying or becoming liable for workmen's compensation to an injured empJoyee has become subrogated by virtue of the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act to the injured employee's right of action ag1ninst a third person,
whose act or omission caused the injury, action may
be broug-ht against such person either in the name
of the e1nploycr or in the name of the employee. To
the same effect is
Theby v. Wisconsin Power & Li.u:ht Company, 222 N. W. 826.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska in
Muncaster v. Graham Ice Cream Co., 1-::!
N. W. 52,
· held rmder the Nebraska statute that the legislature
intended beyond question to give' to fhe injured employee a rig·ht of action where the injury eomplained
of grew out of carelessness or negligence of a third
party, and that the employee has the right to maintain SlH'~l a suit. The provisions of the Nebraska
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32
statute, however, do not appear in the opinion, but
we submit that unleHs there is some definite purpose or intention indicated by the statute which
precludes such right, and where the employer or
insurance carrier have either waived their right of
E!ubrogation or have assigned such right or have
neglected to prosecute an action or refused to prosecute the same, that the employee or his dependents ar~ not deprived of their right to maintain the
action. In the case of
0 'Brien v. Chicago City Railway Company.
137 N. E. 214,
the Court held tha.t in case of injury to an employee
by a stranger not bound by the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, the injured employee is not put to his election between compensation under the statute and damages at common law,
but may prosecute the common law action and stat~
utory claim for compensation at the same tinw
The cases which hold the cause of action assignable
by the employer or insurance carrier who have paid
compensation, do not always assign the reason for
such holding. In California the rule has been established, as in Utah, that claims for damages for per~
sonal injuries grmving out of torts such as assaults,
slander, malicious prosecution or fal~e imprisonment may not be assigned, but injuries to property
may be assigned,
Stalev v. McClurken, 96 P. (2d} 805.
but the California Court held, as has the Utah
Court, that injuries to property may be assign·~d
and that the distinction between assignable and
non-as~:ignable causes arising in torts is determined
by survivorship of the action after the death of the
injured party; that if _the claim survives the deat~
of the party, it is assignable, but if it expires with
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his death, it is not assig-nable. ~his, we think, is
the general rule in most jurisdictions, but the California rule establishes the fnet that the action for
injury to property does survive the death of the
owner thereof, and therefore an action for injury to
the property g-rowing out of a tort may be prosecuted by his representatives or by his assignee.
To the same effect is
Jackson v. Deanbille Holding Company, 27
P. (2d) 643.
In the case of
Morris v. Standard Oil Company, (Calif.),
252 P. 605,
the California Court recogmized this rule as authorizing the assignment of a cause of action growing
out of an injury to an employee. In thjs case, one
:f\forris was seriously injured hy a truck opPrat.ed
by the Standard Oil Company while in the course
of his employment by the Chronicle Publishing Cmnpany. The employee brought an action against the
Oil Company for damages and recovered $12,000.00.
The action was defended by the Ocean Accident &
Guaranty Comp~ny, which company was the insurance carrier of both the Oil Company ~nd Morris's
employer. The ipsurance company supplied Inedical aid to the employee and paid him disability benefits. When Morris brought his suit against the Oil
Company, neither the employer nor its insurance
carrier were joined in the action and neither instituted a separate action. Under the c~11ifornia
statute, the insurance earrier became subrog-ated to
the rights of the employer and was entitled to enforce such rights in its own name. The statute in
this respect provided that when an employer is insured against liability for compensation "'ith an
insurance rarrier and sne'h carrier shall have paid
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any compensation for which the employer is liable
or furnished or provided any medical service~ required by the act, such insurance carrier shall be
subrogated to all the rights of the employer and may
enforce such rights in its own name. 'rhe insurance
carrier petitioned for a lien against the judgment
obtained by the employee for the amount which it
had expended, which lien was granted upon the
condition, however, that it assign to the employep,
any and all claims, demands or causes of action it
might have against the company for the amount
paid by it to the employee. Subsequently, there was
a settlement of the controversy and the Oil Company retained and presumably paid to the insurance company the sum of $800.64 of the amount
agreed to be paid by the Oil Company to the employee in satisfaction of the judgment. The Oil
Company then refused to ackno·wledge the legality
of the assignment or to pay the amount assigned,
and tl1r employee as assignee instituted this suit,
setting up the assignment and basing his cause of
action thereon. In passing upon the legality of the
assignment, the Supreme Court of California says:
''The cause of action here assigned is not
one arising in fa~'nr of the employE;e by reason of his injurie~. . 1111t out of the obligation
imposed by the \Vorkmen 's Compensation
Act on the Oil Company which cau..;ed a
property injury to the employer, to reimburse the employer or its subrogated insurance carrier for the amount of disahiJit:v indemnity paid the emplo~ree ''
Any right conferred by statute upon the employer
or insurance carrier by reason of the payment of
the compensation to an injured employee or hi~
dependents is a rif-!·ht arising by operation of la'v
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and could be nothing more than a property right.
If a property right then under the decision of the
California Court and the decision of this Court in
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. D. & R. G.
Ry. Co., supra.
the cause of action was assignable, and the employee
would be entitled to maintain the action to the extent of recovering at least the 3mount that his
assignor was damaged in such property right. The
California statute seems to be different from most
statutes in that the right of subrogation passes to
the insurance carrier from the employer and the
employer's right would be limited to the mnonnt
paid as compensation.
We respectfully submit that a reasonable construction of our statute as it has existed since the 1933
revision should be construed so as to permit thP.
employee- or his dependents to maintain his action
against any third person by whose wrong£ul or neg_
ligent conduct the employee has been injured or
his dependents suffered a loss by reason of the
death of such. employee, and that the statute contemp•lates such an interest in the employee or his
dependents as to-n1ake said persons the real partie~
in interest. That while the statute seems to contemplate that the mnployer or insurance carrier may
maintain the action against such third party for
the entire damage growing out of the injury or·
death of the employee, yet the beneficial interest
in such recovery is limited by the amount paid as
compensation, and that such interest is purely n
property right subject to assignment and upon
assignment, as in the case at bar. the employee may
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maintain his action for the entire loss suffered by
the negligent or wrongful act of such third person.
That the right recognized by the statute in the employer or insurance carrier is subject to be waived
or assigned and that where the employer or insurance carrier for a reasonable pericd fails or neglects
to bring the action or waives its right of subrogation or assigns, then such action may be brought by
the employee to preserve and protect the benefits
intended by the statute to pass to the en;ployee or
his dependents, and we submit that in view of the
authorities upon this question and a const_ruction
of the statute in confonnity with the evident purpos.es of the legislature, the order of the District
Court sustaining tlie defendant's demurrer and
dismissing plaintiffs' complaint should be reversed,
and the District Court ordered to overrule the demurrer, and require the defendant to answer.
Respectfully submitted>

E. LEROY SHIELDS

AND

A. H. HOUGAARD,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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